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The Wheels of Justice in Extradition 
Dr Paul Arnell 
Reader in Law, Robert Gordon University 
 
Two recent extradition cases involving Scots lend considerable support to 
the epithet that the wheels of justice grind slowly but exceedingly fine. 
These are the Supreme Court judgment dated 28 June 2017, Dean (Zain 
Taj) v Lord Advocate [2017] UKSC 44; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 2721; 2017 S.L.T. 
773, and the European Court of Human Rights decision dated 10 July 2017, 
Harkins v United Kingdom (application no.71537/14). Both cases also 
challenge the perception that human rights frustrate the operation of 
international criminal justice. 
 
Dean (Zain Taj) v Lord Advocate  
 
Dean was an appeal by the Lord Advocate under Sch.6 para.13 to the 
Scotland Act 1998 against a determination by the High Court of Justiciary. 
That determination, an appeal under s.103 of the Extradition Act 2003, held 
by a majority that there were substantial grounds for believing there was a 
real risk of Dean being subjected to treatment incompatible with ECHR art.3 
prohibiting torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon 
his extradition back to Taiwan. That decision was noted by the present 
author in The continuing tension between human rights and extradition, 
2016 S.L.T. (News), pp.211–214. Whilst the High Court refused to give 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, again by a majority, a panel of that 
court granted the Lord Advocate permission to appeal 21 December 2016. 
 
Factually, Dean was involved in a road accident that caused the death of a 
Taiwanese delivery man in March 2010. He grew up in Edinburgh and had 
gone on to live and work in Taiwan. He was convicted by a Taiwanese court 
of driving under the influence of alcohol, negligent manslaughter and 
leaving the scene of an accident. He was ultimately sentenced to four years’ 
imprisonment. Pending an appeal to the Taiwanese Supreme Court, in 
2012, he absconded from Taiwan using the passport of a friend. Taiwanese 
authorities have been seeking his extradition October 2013. 
 
The Supreme Court faced two main questions in Dean. These were whether 
the appeal itself was competent and whether the High Court applied the 
correct legal test in assessing the harm which Dean might face in Taipei 
prison. The argument that the Supreme Court lacked competence to hear 
the appeal was based upon the view that the High Court had not determined 
a devolution issue and accordingly there was no appeal to the Supreme 
Court. As the appeal to the High Court was made under s.103 of the 
Extradition Act 2003, it was suggested an appeal was not competent in that 
the provision authorising an appeal under that Act did not extend to 
Scotland. 
 
Lord Hodge, who gave an opinion with which the four other justices agreed, 
held that this challenge was "misconceived" (at 2017 S.L.T., p.777 
para.14). He held that the High Court had in fact determined a devolution 
issue, that being whether "a purported or proposed exercise of a function 
by a member of the Scottish Executive is, or would be, incompatible with 
any of the Convention rights", as per Sch.6 para.1(d) to the 1998 Act. That 
Dean chose the option of appealing to the High Court under s.103 instead 
of raising a devolution issue under the Scotland Act 1998, Lord Hodge held, 
did not affect the competence of the appeal to the Supreme Court. 
 
The substantive issue facing the Supreme Court concerned the correct legal 
test to be applied when assessing the risk of harm an individual subject to 
extradition might face in the requesting state from non-state actors within 
it. In the introductory comments of his opinion Lord Hodge highlights that 
the case put before the Supreme Court by the Lord Advocate was different 
from that put before the High Court. The argument, therefore, entailed "… 
criticising the judges of the Appeal Court for not giving effect to an 
argument which they did not hear" (at 2017 S.L.T., p.775, para.3). 
 
The focus upon non-state actors in the Lord Advocate’s argument to the 
Supreme Court is what set it apart from that put forward in the High Court. 
Non-state actors were relevant because the risk Dean faced in Taipei prison 
did not come from the prison authorities or by virtue of the 
conditions*S.L.T. 144  within the prison, rather it came from fellow inmates 
who might attack him on account of his notoriety and the especial treatment 
he was afforded. In light of this particular risk the test to be applied was 
found in R (on the application of Bagdanavicius) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2005] UKHL 38; [2005] 2 A.C. 668; [2005] 2 W.L.R. 
1359. In that case Lord Brown held that harm inflicted by non-state agents 
will not constitute ECHR art.3 ill treatment unless the state has failed to 
provide reasonable protection to the individual from that violent treatment 
(at  [2005] 2 A.C., p.677 para.24). 
 
The Supreme Court applied the non-state actors test to the conditions in 
Taipei prison in light of the assurances Taiwan gave the UK designed to 
mitigate them and make Dean’s incarceration art.3 compliant. In doing so 
it referred to the criteria laid down by the ECtHR in Othman v United 
Kingdom (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 1; 32 B.H.R.C. 62. The court noted that Taiwan 
was a developed society with a tradition for respect for the rule of law, the 
assurances were specific and that UK consular staff would have access to 
Dean and could bring a breach of the assurances to the attention of the 
prison authorities. In regard to reasonable protection, Lord Hodge held that 
there was no evidence to support an inference that the Taiwanese 
authorities would not give Dean reasonable protection against harm at the 
hands of other prisoners. He noted in particular that the assurances 
provided Dean could choose to remain in his cell and take outdoors exercise 
alone. 
 
Having pronounced upon the reasonable protection point, the Supreme 
Court moved onto whether the particular regime promised Dean, entailing 
as it did measures to protect him from the wider prison population, would 
risk a breach of art.3. It held it did not. He would experience ‘relative 
isolation’, including sharing his cell with a foreign non-violent prisoner, have 
access to newspapers etcetera and could be visited. These circumstances 
were held to not come close to a breach of art.3. The Lord Advocate’s appeal 
was allowed, and the case was remitted to the High Court to consider Dean’s 
appeal under s.108 (concerning the Secretary of State’s decision to order 
his extradition) and his devolution minute in that appeal. 
 
Harkins v United Kingdom  
 
Harkins was an application to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights where the applicant challenged his extradition to the United 
States on the basis of ECHR arts 3 and 6. The latter, as is well known, 
guarantees the right to a fair trial. The proceedings up to this decision are 
of a considerably longer duration than those in Dean. The crime begetting 
the litigation occurred in 1999, with the original extradition request to the 
UK being made in in March 2003. The most relevant previous judicial 
decision is Harkins v the United Kingdom [2012] 6 Costs L.O. 733; (2012) 
55 E.H.R.R. 19. This was a decision of a Chamber of the ECtHR over five 
years previously where Harkins challenged his extradition on similar 
grounds. The present application argued that the law governing mandatory 
life sentences had developed under ECtHR jurisprudence and therefore a 
renewed consideration was merited. 
 
Phillip Harkins, from Greenock, was indicted for first degree murder and 
attempted robbery with a firearm in Florida in 2000. By a Diplomatic Note 
the US assured the UK that the death penalty would not be sought or 
imposed. If convicted of first degree murder, therefore, Harkins faced the 
sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole. In 2012, Harkins 
challenged that sentence under art.3. The ECtHR held that that sentence 
would not be grossly disproportionate. Particularly, it held that Harkins had 
not demonstrated that his incarceration would serve no penological 
purpose. The ECtHR noted that if his incarceration reached that point it was 
possible to petition the Governor of Florida and the Board of Executive 
Clemency seeking the commutation of his sentence. 
 
Subsequent to Harkins’ 2012 decision the Grand Chamber pronounced on 
life sentences in Vinter v United Kingdom (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1; 34 B.H.R.C. 
605; [2014] Crim. L.R. 81, and two other cases. It held that art.3 requires 
the reducibility of a life sentence entailing a review which would inter alia 
involve domestic authorities considering whether the incarceration was no 
longer justified on legitimate penological grounds. It also held that a whole 
life prisoner was entitled to know at the outset of his sentence what he must 
do to be considered for release, under what conditions, and when that 
review would take place or could be sought. A further decision of the 
ECtHR,*S.L.T. 145  Trabelsi v Belgium (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 21; 38 B.H.R.C. 
26, held that an extradition to the US violated art.3 because it exposed the 
individual, Trabelsi, to a risk of a life sentence without parole. Of final 
relevance to Harkins’ present application was a decision of the English High 
Court on 7 November 2014, R (on the application of Harkins) v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 3609 (Admin); [2015] 1 
W.L.R. 2975; [2015] A.C.D. 33, which took the unusual step of applying a 
test analogous to that found in the Civil Procedure Rules for reopening 
appeals. That approach was taken in light of the jurisprudential 
developments at the ECtHR. The High Court held that there had not been a 
change in the law such that the human rights of Harkins were fundamentally 
affected. 
 
Harkins submitted the present application to the ECtHR after the High 
Court’s refusal to reopen proceedings. He argued that following Vinter and 
Trablesi his extradition would breach art.3 since the sentencing and 
clemency regimes in Florida did not meet the requirements set out therein. 
Harkins submitted that his complaint was not substantially the same as that 
made in 2012. The legal landscape was different and there had been 
domestic proceedings following Vinter and Trablesi where new arguments 
were put to the High Court. He further argued, under art.6, that the 
imposition of life imprisonment without parole would constitute a flagrant 
denial of justice. In response, the UK Government submitted that Harkins’ 
complaint was based on the same facts, the same charge, the same 
sentencing regime and the same clemency process. The only change, it 
said, was the development of the ECtHR’s case law which was not "relevant 
new information". Accordingly, the complaint was not admissible because 
ECHR art.35(2) required applications not be "… substantially the same as a 
matter that has already been examined" and that they contained "relevant 
new information". The UK Government argued that art.35(2) had to be 
interpreted in light of its purpose, that being the upholding the principle of 
legal certainty and finality, and that that principle would be undermined 
were changes in ECtHR jurisprudence deemed "relevant new information". 
 
The Grand Chamber held that whether the domestic proceedings 
constituted "relevant new information" was "… inextricably linked to the 
question of whether the development of the ECtHR’s case law itself was 
"relevant new information" (at para.46). Therefore it had to decide whether 
the development of its case law "… by itself constitutes ‘relevant new 
information’ for the purposes of … art.35(2)" (at para.48). In answering this 
it relied upon the rules of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law or Treaties 1969 which required that words be interpreted 
according to their ordinary meaning and in their context and in light of the 
object and purpose of the provision from which they are drawn. In line with 
the UK Government’s view that purpose, the Grand Chamber noted, was to 
serve the interests of finality and legal certainty by preventing applicants 
from seeking to appeal against previous judgments or decisions by lodging 
fresh applications (at para.51). It stated "… legal certainty constitutes one 
of the fundamental elements of the rule of law which requires, inter alia, 
that where a court has finally determined an issue, its ruling should not be 
called into question" (at para.54). In light of the object and purpose of the 
provision and the obligation to give the words their ordinary meaning the 
Grand Chamber held "… the Court cannot but conclude that the 
development in its jurisprudence does not constitute relevant new 
information" (at para.56). Harkins’ complaint under art.3 was rejected as 
inadmissible. 
 
The Grand Chamber dealt with Harkins’ art.6 argument relatively briefly. 
He had suggested that the imposition of a life sentence without parole in 
the absence of an opportunity to consider the facts of the individual offence 
and the offender would constitute a flagrant denial of justice. This argument 
was held to be manifestly ill-founded. The "flagrant denial of justice" test, 
the court held, is a stringent one, and one where the applicant must adduce 
evidence capable of proving there are substantial grounds for believing that, 
if removed, he would face a real risk of such a denial. Harkins’ submission 
on art.6 failed to meet that test. 
 
Comment  
 
The extradition proceedings of Zain Dean are not over. He is presently back 
in Scotland awaiting his Extradition Act 2003 s.108 appeal, with a 
preliminary hearing scheduled for 19 September. Those of Phillip Harkins 
are complete. He was extradited to the US on 20 July. He appeared in court 
in Jacksonville Florida 21 July. Both sets of proceedings have obviously 
taken some considerable time. The crime at the heart of Dean’s*S.L.T. 146  
case took place in 2010, with Taiwan’s extradition request being made in 
2013. The homicide in Harkins’ case occurred in 1999, with the US firstly 
seeking him from the UK in 2003. Critics of the pace of extradition cases 
thus have ready fodder. The Extradition Act 2003 has clearly failed to 
expedite the process in all cases. The question arising, of course, is whether 
the length of time taken is, in all the circumstances, reasonable or not. A 
different but related question is whether extradition law, and particularly 
the role of human rights therein, unjustifiably frustrates the operation of 
transnational criminal justice. 
 
A first point to make about Dean and Harkins is that they are exceptional. 
The Extradition Act 2003 has shortened and streamlined the extradition 
process in most cases, and especially within the EU under the European 
Arrest Warrant. There have also been legislative changes since 2003 that 
have taken place in furtherance of this aim. The Anti-social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014, for example, introduced the necessity of leave 
to appeal extradition decisions. A second point is that extradition cases can 
entail complex and multifaceted issues concerning not only what can be 
thought of orthodox extradition subjects such as double criminality and 
speciality, but also of human rights, treaty interpretation, the scrutiny of a 
third state’s assurances, the comity of nations, differences in approaches to 
criminal justice and punishment, and the commonly accepted imperative to 
address transnational criminality. As described above, these considerations 
can conspire to elongate the extradition process considerably. On balance, 
though, especially in light of the possibility of there being very serious 
consequences of an extradition – life imprisonment without parole in 
Harkins’ case – it is not unreasonable that the process takes the time it 
does. 
 
The cases of Dean and Harkins give a rather emphatic answer to the 
question of whether human rights within extradition law frustrate 
transnational criminal justice. That answer is, at the end of the day, no. In 
both cases human rights arguments have failed to bar extradition. Of course 
Dean’s litigation continues, and so the final position is not yet clear. Human 
rights in his case have, to date, only delayed matters. In Harkins’ case, 
human rights arguments have failed to bar his extradition where he faces a 
fate which would not befall someone convicted of the crimes he is accused 
of within this country. The perception that human rights are ultimately 
inimical to the operation of transnational criminal justice is fallacious. The 
issues are complex and the law is evolving. The wheels of justice therefore 
necessarily grind finely and slowly. 
